Review of Matthews, M.R. (2015). Science Teaching: The Contribution of History and Philosophy of Science (20th Anniversary Revised and Expanded Edition). New York: Routledge1,2  by Niaz, Mansoor
Educación Química (2015) 26(2), 174-176
0187-893X All Rights Reserved © 2015 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Química. This is an open access item distributed under 
the Creative Commons CC License BY-NC-ND 4.0. 
www.educacionquimica.info
Químicaeducación
E-mail address: niazma@gmail.com (M. Niaz).
☆  Solicitada por el Director de la revista, dada la importancia que tuvo y tendrá el libro de Michael Matthews en el terreno de la enseñanza 
de la ciencia.
☆☆  A preliminary version of this review was presented at The 2nd International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Asian Regional 
Conference, 4-7 December, 2014, Taipei, Taiwan.
RESEÑAS
Review of Matthews, M.R. (2015).
Science Teaching: The Contribution of History 
and Philosophy of Science (20th Anniversary Revised 
and Expanded Edition). New York: Routledge☆,☆☆
Mansoor Niaz
Epistemology of Science Group, Department of Chemistry, Universidad de Oriente, Venezuela 
Introduction 
$FFRUGLQJWRODWHVW*RRJOH6FKRODU&LWDWLRQÀJXUHVWKHÀUVW
(1994) edition of this book has over 1,500 citations, more 
than double of its closest rival. For science education 
UHVHDUFKWKHVHDUHIDLUO\KLJKÀJXUHV
The revised edition has the following 12 chapters: 1) The 
reapproachment between history, philosophy and science 
education; 2) The enlightenment tradition in science 
education; 3) Historical and current developments in 
science curricula; 4) History of science in the curriculum 
and in classrooms; 5) Philosophy in science and in science 
classrooms; 6) History and philosophy in the classroom: 
Pendulum motion; 7) History and philosophy in the 
classroom: Joseph Priestley and the discovery of 
photosynthesis; 8) Constructivism and science education; 
9) A central issue in philosophy of science and science 
education: Realism and anti-realism; 10) Science, 
worldviews and education; 11) The nature of science and 
science teaching; and 12) Philosophy of teacher education. 
Although the titles of some of the chapters are the same as 
LQWKHÀUVWHGLWLRQWKHFRQWHQWKDVEHHQWKRURXJKO\UHYLVHG
and enlarged. Besides revising the chapters the author has 
taken care to include the current debates in the science 
education community. The details provided in each chapter 
are so diverse that one could write a review for every 
chapter. Consequently, this reviewer has decided to write 
with respect to only some of the chapters.
Enlightenment philosophy
Chapter 2 is devoted to the Enlightenment philosophers 
(Locke, Voltaire, Hume, Kant, among others) that 
represented the age of reason in the 18th century. Although 
the views of these philosophers varied they shared some 
core commitments, such as: free speech, separation of 
church and state, blasphemy should not be a crime, the 
church should not monopolize or control schooling, and 
state service should be open to the followers of all religions 
(p. 24). The period before the 18th century was 
characterized by torture, burning and hanging of heretics by 
both the catholic and protestant churches (p. 25). Matthews 
provides a dramatic turn by stating: “The Salem witch trials 
took place in Massachusetts in 1692, 5 years after publication 
of Newton’s Principia” (p. 25). In order to provide a 
balanced picture, Matthews also presents a critique of the 
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reality can be known or is forever inaccessible. Despite this 
constructivists (especially radical and social), advocate 
empirical research in order to support their theories. If the 
reality is forever elusive, it is not clear how the evidence 
can facilitate a better understanding and hence the 
dilemma. In order to highlight the contradiction in 
constructivist thinking, Matthews goes beyond and asserts: 
“Here, it is being said that the Earth does not have a 
structure until geophysicists impose it; there is not an 
evolutionary structure in the animal world until biologists 
impose such structure; atoms have no structure until such is 
imposed by physicists; and so on. One might ask: if gravity 
waves are our creation, why spend so much time and money 
looking for them?” (p. 312). These are important questions 
for science educators. It is one thing to say that atoms have 
no structure of their own and the scientists impose such a 
structure. In contrast, one could reason that atoms do have 
a structure and scientists are developing the experimental 
methods required for understanding that reality, hence the 
multiplicity of atomic models in the history of science: 
Dalton, Thomson, Rutherord, Bohr, Bohr-Sommerfeld and 
wave mechanical models of the atom. Furthermore, this 
facilitates the construction of atomic models that 
progressively increase in their explanatory power and thus 
LOOXVWUDWHWKHWHQWDWLYHQDWXUHRIVFLHQWLÀFSURJUHVV,QD
similar vein, Niaz (2011) has established an analogy between 
the progressive nature of atomic models and the changing 
nature of various forms of constructivism, such as: Trivial 
constructivism in 1960 (Piaget), human constructivism in 
1970 (Ausubel and Novak), radical constructivism in 1980 
(Von Glasersfeld), social constructivism in 1990 (Vygotsky) 
and pragmatic constructivism in 1999 (Perkins). Perkins 
(2006) has called for a more pragmatic approach to 
constructivism, more like a Swiss army knife with various 
blades for various needs.
Nature of science
In his book The Unnatural Nature of Science, Lewis Wolpert, 
a developmental biologist, states cogently:
“… both the ideas that science generates and the 
way in which science is carried out are entirely 
counter intuitive and against common sense — by 
which I mean that scientific ideas cannot be 
acquired by simple inspection of phenomena and 
that they are often outside everyday experience. 
6FLHQFHGRHVQRWÀWZLWKRXUQDWXUDOH[SHFWDWLRQVµ
(Lewis Wolpert, 1993, p. 1, italics added).
With this background it is understandable why nature of 
science (NOS) is a controversial topic in science education, 
as most science curricula and textbooks emphasize simple 
inspection of phenomena, assuming that nature’s secret can 
be easily perceived. 
Matthews reviews the different approaches to 
understanding NOS in science education, among others the 
consensus view (Lederman, Abd-El-Khalick) and the family 
resemblance view (Irzik, Nola). Matthews is particularly 
critical of the consensus view: “The assumption that NOS 
enlightenment by feminists, constructivists, postmodernists 
and multiculturalists. With this background, Matthews 
suggests that perhaps the enlightenment thinking facilitated 
the introduction of a secular education and understanding 
of nature of science (NOS) free from different dogmas. If 
one could extend this line of reasoning it is no wonder that 
in most parts of the developing world even in the 21st 
century secular and universal education is still a chimera. 
Actually, Matthews goes into considerable detail to illustrate 
the case of India (pp. 49-51). Soon after independence in 
1947, India’s first Prime Minister J. Nehru (1889-1964) 
introduced educational reforms in the national constitution 
that included concepts such as: “scientific outlook”, 
“scientific habit of mind”, and “scientific temper”. 
According to Matthews most recent reform documents in 
different parts of the world (e.g., Project 2061, American 
Association for the Advancement of Science) could not even 
dream of including such illuminating concepts. However, 
despite all the good intentions most of these dreams did not 
come to fruition due to criticisms of the postmodernists and 
the conservative elements in the Indian society. This led 
Matthews to conclude that India’s case is similar to other 
places where educational reform has to steer through 
philosophical ideas, politics, economics and religion (for 
details see Nanda, 2003).
Another subject in Chapter 2 deals with a reappraisal of 
the myth and reality of positivism in the science education 
literature (pp. 43-44). Matthews draws attention to the 
need to re-conceptualize our understanding of positivism, 
especially with respect to two positivist philosophers (Frank 
and Feigl) and following are some of the salient aspects of 
these philosophers’ thinking: a) Both recognize the 
theoretical dependence of observation; b) Do not promote 
unquestioning textbook learning (that is rules and 
algorithms); c) Do not approve of behaviorist psychology; 
and d) Do recognize the importance of history, especially for 
science education. 
Constructivism
Chapter 8 deals with constructivism a topic of considerable 
interest to science educators. While reading this chapter I 
was reminded of the 1990 Annual Conference of the 
National Association for Research Science Teaching (NARST), 
Atlanta, GA. Rosalind Driver was the Plenary Speaker and 
she started her talk by the following words: “Now that we 
DUHDOOFRQVWUXFWLYLVWV«µ6KHFRXOGQRWÀQLVKKHUVHQWHQFH
as a young tall man stood up and said: “Just leave me 
out…”. Driver at that time was at the peak of her popularity 
and continues to be a much respected figure. The young 
man was Michael Matthews, unknown to most of the 
conference participants. This episode illustrates Michael’s 
strong, honest and forthright views on controversial topics. 
In this  chapter (p.  303) Matthews explains that 
constructivism is presented both as theory of learning 
(psychological theory) and a theory of knowledge 
(philosophical and epistemological theory). After presenting 
a detailed critique of radical and social constructivism, 
Matthews rightly refers to “An evidential dilemma.” The 
dilemma lies in the fact that many constructivists deny that 
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Grandy, 2013). This may not only surprise science educators 
but may even be disconcerting to those who are beginning 
their careers in science education. Interestingly, Matthews 
cites these authors in the references but do not comment 
on these views in the text of the chapter. Matthews however 
does make an important contribution by suggesting that the 
various aspects of NOS be considered as Features of Science 
(FOS) that are more relaxed, contextual and heterogeneous. 
This will facilitate the inclusion of numerous other features, 
such as epistemological, historical, psychological, social, 
and technological.
Finally, the new edition of the book by Matthews is a rich 
source of historical, epistemological and philosophical ideas 
that can be of immense help to the graduate students, 
teachers and researchers.
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learning can be judged and assessed by students’ capacity 
to identify some numbers of declarative statements about 
NOS” (p. 389). Despite this, he recognizes that such an 
approach to NOS is positive as it “puts NOS into the 
classrooms” (p. 393) and at the same time negative as it 
constitutes “a catechism”. Understanding this difference is 
critical for introducing NOS in the classroom. If a teacher 
wants to evaluate students’ understanding of NOS prior to 
teaching about NOS then the instruments developed by the 
Lederman group are quite appropriate. However, if the 
teacher wants to go beyond and teach about NOS in the 
context of a particular topic of the science curriculum then 
it is essential to “immerse” in the history of science. 
Matthews draws attention to the fact that the importance 
of history of science for education was recognized by 
Whewell (1855), English scientist, philosopher and historian 
more than one hundred years before Popper, Kuhn and 
Lakatos: “Whewell’s point is worth drawing attention to, as 
so much NOS discussion in science education goes in direct 
violation of it. NOS is frequently taught without reference 
to history and is not informed by history” (p. 390). For 
anyone who has followed the development and progress of 
the journal Science & Education, over the last 23 years this 
should not be a surprise. Recent publication of the 
International Handbook of Research in History, Philosophy 
and Science Teaching (Matthews, 2014) is a further 
vindication of the historical approach to teaching NOS and 
science. Nevertheless, two distinguished science educators 
have argued that current philosophy of science has gone 
beyond the historical turn (Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan) and now 
espouses a naturalist philosophy of science, and suggested 
that the views of those who emphasize history of science 
are “Grounded in dated (logical positivism and historical 
turn) views that depict NOS through heuristics that focus on 
LQGLYLGXDOVFLHQWLVWVMXVWLÀFDWLRQRINQRZOHGJHµ'XVFKO	
